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Policy making in Northern Ireland:  
ignoring the evidence
Colin Knox
The public policy-making process in Northern Ireland during the period of direct rule 
from Westminster (1972–99) was dominated by senior civil servants working for busy 
British ministers preoccupied with wider constitutional and security issues. The recent 
return to devolved government after its fitful start has ushered in a new era of policy 
making informed to a much greater extent by evidence gathering. This article considers a 
significant policy issue – the Review of Public Administration in Northern Ireland – as a 
means of examining how policy making is influenced by macro political factors aimed at 
stabilising the power-sharing Executive.
Introduction
The current system of public administration in Northern Ireland is both cumbersome 
and piecemeal. Its current format dates back only to December 1999 at which 
point power was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and its Executive 
Committee as a result of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. Prior to devolution, 
six government departments were responsible to direct rule/Westminster ministers 
whose major preoccupation was security and constitutional issues, leaving senior 
civil servants to administer key public services in a largely unaccountable way. These 
circumstances resulted directly from wider political developments that led to the 
prorogation of the local Parliament (Stormont) in March 1972 – the so-called 
‘Northern Ireland troubles’. One of the underlying factors behind the protests that 
characterised the early period of the troubles was discontent with public services 
among the nationalist population. The early 1970s, for example, witnessed the civil 
rights movement demand major reforms in local government in order to address 
unionist hegemony asserted through gerrymandered electoral wards, restricted 
franchise and discriminatory housing practices (Birrell and Murie, 1980; O’Dowd 
et al, 1980). Reforms came in the shape of the Macrory Report (1970), which 
divided services into regional (Stormont) and district administrative units (local 
authorities). Macrory’s proposals were, however, overtaken by political events and 
the implementation of direct rule from Westminster. In the absence of a regional 
tier at Stormont, what emerged was an emasculated form of local government 
and key public services delivered through a highly centralised system of public 
administration (Knox, 1999). Direct rule witnessed ad hoc reforms to public sector 
structures and a hugely bureaucratic response to the delivery of basic public services. 
When devolution came in 1999, local ministers launched the Review of Public 
Administration (RPA) in which the Executive pledged from the outset ‘to lead the 
most effective and accountable form of government in Northern Ireland’ (Northern 
Ireland Executive, 2002: 6).
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At the start of the review, 11 government departments were responsible for the 
bulk of ‘transferred’ public services;1 18 executive agencies operated within the 
remit of departments; and around 100 non-departmental public bodies carried 
out functions normally within the purview of elected bodies in other parts of 
the UK (eg education and libraries, health and social services, and housing). Local 
government (26 district councils) assumed a minor public service delivery role, 
responsible for less than 5% of the public purse. With the advent of a new devolved 
political dispensation in 1999, the (then) First Minister in the Assembly described it 
as ‘an opportunity to put in place a modern, accountable, effective system of public 
administration that can deliver a high quality set of public services to our citizens’ 
(Trimble, 2002: 15).
The terms of reference for the RPA were:
To review the existing arrangements for the accountability, administration and 
delivery of public services in Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options 
for reform which are consistent with the arrangements and principles of the 
Belfast Agreement, within an appropriate framework of political and financial 
accountability. (RPA, 2003: 39)
The suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly in October 2002 led to British 
ministers assuming control of the review process, but at that point with the 
understanding that a returning Executive would take ‘more detailed decisions which 
will be necessary following agreement on the broad scope and characteristics of any 
new system’ (Pearson, 2003: 3). In the absence of a wider political agreement to re-
establish devolution, the (then) Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Peter Hain) 
announced the outcomes of the review process in the document Better government 
for Northern Ireland: Final decisions of the Review of Public Administration in March 2006 
(Northern Ireland Office, 2006).
This article will examine three issues. First, it will outline the considerable body 
of evidence amassed by the review team to support the proposed changes in public 
administration in Northern Ireland. Second, it will highlight examples of where 
the review appears to be unravelling and a new set of decisions put in place. Third, 
it will reflect on what this case study tells us about the influence of political factors 
in the face of strong empirical evidence on public sector reform.
The selection of the RPA as a case study for examining evidenced-based policy 
making seemed appropriate for two key reasons. First, the sheer volume of empirical 
research undertaken to inform the decision-making process was such that ‘testing’ 
the extent to which this happened could be easily monitored and therefore offered 
the limiting case. If policy was not informed by the weight of evidence in this 
case, how likely would this be in other policy areas? Second, the scale, importance 
and potential impact of this public policy warranted independent scrutiny given 
the vested interests of those involved (civil servants, politicians [Members of the 
Legislative Assembly or MLAs] and councillors). The author was directly involved in 
conducting research commissioned by the review team but remained independent 
of the review process. Hence, the case study examined here is based primarily on 
secondary data of which there is a wealth. Primary data were gathered through 
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facilitation sessions held with local government chief executives, councillors and 
interaction with MLAs in giving evidence to a Stormont committee.
The process
Before considering the evidence that underpinned the RPA, it is important to note 
three process factors that impinged on both the conduct of the review and its early 
implementation. First, the review was conducted by a group of civil servants based in 
the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), supported 
by a panel of independent experts ‘in the fields of governance and organisational 
change’ (RPA, 2005: 9, 145). These arrangements attracted criticism at the outset 
and during its conclusions from some MLAs. Dr Ian Paisley (Democratic Unionist 
Party) said in the original Assembly debate on the issue that ‘this review is not open, 
above board and transparent – it will be under the control of the First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister’, perhaps with a hint of retrospective irony, given that he is 
now First Minister (Paisley, 2002: 63).
Second, the parameters of the review were drawn to exclude the 11 government 
departments. The (then) Deputy First Minister (Mark Durkan) defended this decision 
on the basis that the review was not a means by which ‘to renegotiate the Belfast 
Agreement by the back door’, since the power-sharing Executive was predicated 
on the four main political parties holding ministerial portfolios (Wilson, 2001). Any 
proposals by opponents of the Agreement to dismantle government departments 
under the RPA could therefore have wider political consequences for a power-
sharing Executive. Durkan (2002: 67) argued that to examine ‘the distribution of 
functions between the 11 departments would detract from the main focus of the 
review. Energy would be channelled into turf wars rather than better services’. 
Democratic Unionist Party MLA Sammy Wilson expressed his disappointment 
that government departments would not be included, describing this decision as 
‘an indefensible situation’ (Wilson, 2002: 69).
Third, the influence of the civil service on the review process also attracted 
criticism. Civil servants were seen as somehow complicit in their role of pushing 
through reforms under direct rule arrangements. William Hay (the current speaker 
in the Northern Ireland Assembly) argued during a transitional Assembly debate:
Civil servants and (direct rule) Ministers are not listening. I have no quarrel 
with civil servants; however, they appear to be driving the Review of Public 
Administration through as quickly as possible in the interests of the Secretary 
of State and the direct rule Ministers, so that when the House is up and 
running, there will be very little that anyone can do about it. That is the great 
worry. (Hay, 2006: 47)
Civil servants will argue, in defence, that it is their duty to serve the ministers of 
the day, whether these are direct rule or local ministers.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: S
we
ts
IP
 : 
19
2.
87
.5
0.
3 
O
n:
 T
hu
, 0
5 
Fe
b 
20
09
 1
6:
14
:5
9
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
346 Colin Knox
Policy & Politics  vol 36 no 3 • 343–59 (2008) • 10.1332/030557308X307766 
The evidence
The evidence base for the public sector reforms agenda included a comprehensive 
programme of research. The work undertaken by the review team is set out below 
in summary form.2
Attitudinal surveys
Six separate Northern Ireland-wide attitudinal probability surveys were conducted 
between September 2002 and July 2005 with around 1,200 respondents in each 
survey. The aim of the surveys was to gather the views of the general public on their 
experiences of public services across a range of issues including:
• satisfaction with public services;
• knowledge of who is responsible for public services;
• complaints;
• quality of service;
• service improvement;
• accountability;
• local councils;
• public bodies;
• equality;
• information on public services;
• local identity; and
• public consultation.
Listening to people’s views
The RPA team and panel of independent experts listened (as part of a pre-
consultation exercise) to the views of over 70 organisations including all 26 district 
councils, the five education and library boards, and all the health and personal social 
services organisations. In addition, they commissioned several research consultations. 
Almost 100 structured interviews were completed with senior staff involved in the 
provision of public services, and with key voluntary organisations that access and 
advise on public services. Some 46 structured interviews were conducted with 
elected representatives. Four major focus group studies were carried out to elicit 
people’s experiences of public services as follows:
• 24 focus groups reflecting the make-up of the general population;
• 30 focus groups reflecting the make-up of specific sectors in Northern Ireland 
(minority ethnic groups, older people, younger people, those of different sexual 
orientation and people with disabilities);
• 16 focus groups reflecting the general population who were consulted on specific 
issues of community planning, local roads, libraries, youth services, service delivery, 
governance and equality; and
• 31 focus groups with public sector staff, spanning the range of public sector 
bodies, which drew on their experience of services delivery.
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Study visits
The RPA team undertook a series of study visits to other jurisdictions (Australia, 
Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden 
and the US) to consider how public services were organised elsewhere. They 
examined a range of issues including:
• constitutional measures and structures of government;
• size of regional and local authorities;
• governance and financial arrangements;
• drivers of reform and change;
• service delivery; and
• human resources issues.
Mapping the public sector
The complex structure of the pre-existing Northern Ireland public sector was 
mapped in two ways. First, maps were drawn showing the organisational structure 
of the system of public administration to include staffing levels, budgets and detailed 
functional responsibilities. The maps also depicted financial and accountability 
arrangements between parent departments, agencies, boards, trusts and non-
departmental public bodies. Second, ‘service to citizen’ maps were drawn, which 
grouped services in a way that indicated how citizens accessed them and their 
location within the Northern Ireland Executive’s priorities in Draft programme for 
government (Northern Ireland Executive, 2002).
Briefing papers on key issues
The review commissioned a number of academics to provide a briefing on the 
following key issues in public administration:
• checks and balances;
• civic leadership;
• funding local government;
• leadership;
• local government representation;
• ‘joined-up’ government;
• quality of service;
• partnership;
• e-government;
• accountability;
• semi-state bodies;
• subsidiarity; 
• multi-level governance; and
• public sector reform.
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These papers provided the conceptual context for the work of the review team 
and located the practical details of the RPA reform agenda within a wider research 
framework.
Research reports
Several specific research reports dealt with a range of issues that evolved as the review 
progressed. These included work on a Northern Ireland–Scotland comparison, which 
examined the relative size, structure and funding arrangements of the public sector 
in Northern Ireland compared to Scotland. In addition, research was conducted 
on the distribution of the property wealth base across Northern Ireland aimed at 
assessing how a reconfiguration of local government areas would affect income 
from district and regional rates (Northern Ireland has a property-based rates system 
based on capital value). Work was also completed on aggregating existing local 
government districts to meet a set of criteria around population size, compactness 
and balance in terms of numbers of councils. A financial exercise was conducted 
to estimate the efficiency savings resulting from the implementation of the RPA’s 
recommendations.
Major public consultations
Two Northern Ireland-wide public consultation exercises were held. The first took 
place between October 2003 and February 2004 and sought public reaction to how/
by whom public services might be provided within a range of five models outlined in 
the consultation document (status quo; centralised services; regional and sub-regional 
public bodies; enhanced local government; and strong local government). The first 
consultation resulted in 170 written submissions from a wide range of stakeholders, 
including the political parties, public sector organisations and a number of individuals. 
The second consultation ran from March to September 2005 and sought views 
on the future shape of local government, the administration of health and social 
services, the administrative support for education, the future of non-departmental 
public bodies, and the development of leadership and capacity within the public 
sector. A total of 1,032 responses were received from organisations in the public, 
private, voluntary and community sectors, and private individuals. The majority of 
the responses (62%) came from the education sector and addressed two campaign 
issues (the future of the youth service and the Council for Catholic-maintained 
Schools). Non-campaign responses amounted to 443 replies (RPA, 2005b).
Clearly, this is an impressive body of empirical evidence on which to base policy 
proposals. Research of this order does not come cheap. Under a Freedom of 
Information request, the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) established that 
the review process cost more than £3.5 million over its four-year life. Critics will 
now question its value for money. The figure does not include the costs associated 
with the work of the Local Government Boundaries Commissioner who has made 
recommendations to reconfigure the structure of 26 district councils to seven larger 
local authorities.
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The reforms
The final decisions of the RPA made clear reference to the use of evidence in 
determining the final outcomes. The Secretary of State, in announcing the first 
wave of reforms, commented:
By any standards this has been a thorough review. It has been underpinned by 
a significant body of research, two wide-ranging consultations and has been 
supported by a panel of independent experts appointed by the Executive. It is 
a review which has been open and transparent in every way. (Hain, 2005: 2)
The final decisions contained in the document Better government for Northern Ireland 
(Northern Ireland Office, 2006: 5) refer readers to ‘copies of all the evidence that 
helped to inform’ the final outcomes of the review. Lord Rooker, in setting out 
his specific reforms for the local government sector, argued ‘that all the evidence 
– and I stress evidence – not opinion or speculation, pointed to seven councils as 
the optimum model for local government in Northern Ireland’ (Rooker, 2005: 21). 
In short, the RPA was hailed as a reform package that has been comprehensively 
underpinned by a strong empirical base – a good example of evidence-based policy 
making in practice.
The final decisions emerging from the RPA can be summarised as follows.
Local government reforms
• Local councils will be reduced from 26 to seven by Spring 2009.
• The Local Government Boundaries Commissioner submitted his final 
recommendations on the proposed seven local government districts and 
their constituent wards (seven councils x 60 wards) to the Department of the 
Environment in May 2007.
• The new councils will have an increased range of powers including local roads, 
planning, rural development, planning local bus services, fire and rescue, future 
European programmes and some housing-related functions. The councils will 
also have a statutory duty to lead a community planning process, and all other 
agencies must work with the councils. Councils will be given the power of well-
being.
Education restructuring
• A new education and skills authority will be established (April 2008) to focus 
on the operational delivery of education services. It will also be involved in 
the strategic planning of the schools’ estate and ensuring delivery of the years 
14–19 curriculum. The authority will bring together all the direct support 
functions currently undertaken by the education and library boards, Council 
for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) and the Regional 
Training Unit. It will also have responsibility for frontline and related functions 
currently undertaken by the Council for Catholic-maintained Schools (CCMS), 
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Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) and Comhairle na 
Gaelscolaiochta (CnaG), the Irish language school sector.
• The Department of Education will continue to be responsible for education 
policy and strategy. Some of the operational functions currently performed by 
the Department of Education will transfer to the new authority.
• A new education advisory forum will be established (April 2008), which 
will provide a direct link between education sectors and the Department of 
Education.
Health and social services restructuring
• A single health and social services authority, replacing the existing four health 
and social services boards, will be established to promote the health and well-
being of the community, implement government policies for health and social 
services, and manage the overall performance of the system (from April 2008).
• Seven local commissioning groups (LCGs) will be set up within the health and 
social services authority (fully operational from April 2008); these will map onto 
the new district councils, be demand-led by patients, and driven by general 
practitioners and primary care professionals.
• One patient and client council will replace the existing four health and social 
services councils.
• 18 health and social services trusts will be reduced to five and have been fully 
operational since April 2007 (the Ambulance Service remains as a separate 
trust). 
Quangos
• The remaining 81 public bodies will be reduced to 54. This will be achieved, in the 
main, by merging bodies or transferring complete functions to local government 
or central government. Those quangos that are not transferred or merged will 
have reduced responsibilities through some of their functions moving to local 
government.
The seven council model
The decision to move to the seven council model was critical to the format of the 
reform package, not just for the local government sector itself but also because other 
key functions such as health and policing adopted the new council boundaries. One 
independent expert on the RPA team put this emphatically: ‘we have a complete 
expectation that all public services will now have to organise themselves around the 
geographies of the new seven councils. It will not be that they can opt out of that 
model’ (Frawley, 2005: 10). The review team stressed the empirical basis of arriving 
at the seven council decision. The civil servant leading the review, in evidence to 
the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, argued:
We looked at everything we could measure and all of that research came together 
showing that seven was the optimum number of councils.… We were aware 
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of the feelings of the political parties and others in local government from 
the consultation responses and from elsewhere. We were also aware of other 
views expressed in the consultation where 63% of those who responded on the 
number of councils favoured seven, as against 18% who favoured 15 councils, 
accepting of course that it (the 18%) was the political parties and the local 
government sector. (McConnell, 2005: 4; emphasis added)
This seems a strange admission that confirms that the review team and direct rule 
ministers chose to ignore the views of two key stakeholder groups with whom they 
had consulted – the political parties and the local government sector. That said, the 
response of the local government sector had been timid at best and equivocal at 
worst. The review team argued that during the consultation process with the 26 
local authorities they had offered councillors a zero-based approach to the reforms 
but received mixed views on the range of services that might be delivered by local 
government in the future. Local councillors argued that they should have greater 
legislative powers to act in ways that would benefit the local community but were 
vague on substance. They also suggested that the roles of the Assembly and local 
government should be clearly delineated but failed to elaborate on the details of 
central–local relations (RPA, 2004). In short, when offered the opportunity to be 
ambitious on the future prospects for local government, councillors proved ultra-
conservative in their thinking. They seemed more preoccupied with saving their 
own councils from demise rather than engaging in a strategic debate about the 
sector. As time has past, however, and with the reality that ‘strong local government’ 
promised in the review is a hollow claim, the Northern Ireland Local Government 
Association (NILGA), an umbrella group of all councils, has mobilised effectively 
against the modest concessions available to the sector (NILGA, 2007).
The RPA team leader failed to mention in his evidence to the Northern Ireland 
Affairs Committee that a probability Omnibus Survey of over 1,000 people was 
conducted by the government’s own statistics unit (the Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency), which arrived at very different conclusions to those announced 
by the Secretary of State in his final decisions policy paper. The results are shown in 
Table 1, which compares data from the Northern Ireland-wide probability survey 
with those of the self-selected public consultation responses.
The data show that the critical decision to move to a seven council model was 
based on 70 self-selected consultees who responded to the RPA’s public consultation, 
while the views of a random sample of people throughout Northern Ireland were 
ignored (data that can be extrapolated to the overall population within confidence 
intervals). The RPA team’s defence of this position was that the respondents to the 
public consultation represented significant organisations such as the Confederation of 
Table 1: How many councils?
Preference expressed Omnibus Survey Public consultation
7 councils 26% (n=150) 62% (n=70)
11 councils 21% (n=126) 20% (n=23)
15 councils 53% (n=310) 18% (n=20)
Total 100% (n=586) 100% (n=113)
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British Industry (CBI), the Institute of Directors (IoD) and a number of community 
and voluntary organisations. The RPA team argued that these organisations carried 
‘more weight’ than survey consultees. By way of rebuttal, the Chair of the Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee (Sir Patrick Cormack) pressed the leader of the review 
team to quantify the number of votes cast (at the local government elections) 
for councillors disagreeing with the seven-council option. The RPA team leader 
responded:
I cannot tell you that. We did not make a recommendation to ministers. We as 
a review team conducted this review in a very open and consultative manner 
… our analysis points to seven as the optimum for service delivery and we 
always emphasise that it was service delivery. We accepted totally that there 
were political factors; there were softer issues that could only be dealt with 
politically. (McConnell, 2005: 5)
No explanation was provided as to the nature of the ‘softer political issues’.
Unravelling the review?
The restoration of devolution and the establishment of a power-sharing Executive 
on 8 May 2007 witnessed local political parties revisiting the outcomes of the review, 
in particular the proposals for local government. This is hardly surprising given that, 
during the consultations, four of the five main political parties were in favour of 15 
councils and expressed concerns about the loss of local identity and the potential 
for ‘balkanisation’ of Northern Ireland with a significant East/West split in religious 
segregation. Since then, there have been several significant developments. 
Health Minister Michael McGimpsey announced (6 July 2007) that he needed 
more time to consider the establishment of the proposed health and social services 
authority, which was intended to replace Northern Ireland’s existing four health and 
social services boards. The Minister claimed in a memo to his staff that ‘the Review 
of Public Administration is not my plan, as I was not involved in the decisions taken 
under Direct Rule’ (McGimpsey, 2007: 1). A delay in this key structural reform in 
health has been announced despite the fact that many of the senior management 
appointments to the new authority have already been made.
Education Minister Caitríona Ruane announced (19 July 2007) that ‘the 
review of public administration project in education is too big and complex’ to 
try to implement by April 2008 (Ruane, 2007: 2). She therefore agreed, with the 
endorsement of the Northern Ireland Executive, to postpone the setting up of the 
new education and skills authority by up to one year. The Minister pointed out 
that in drawing up her plans for change in the education sector ‘there is adequate 
time for scrutiny of legislation by the Education Committee and the Assembly’ 
(Ruane, 2007: 2). A strong suggestion that things could change as a consequence 
of such scrutiny.
Finally, Environment Minister Arlene Foster announced (6 July 2007) a new 
review of local government, which will consider three elements:
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: S
we
ts
IP
 : 
19
2.
87
.5
0.
3 
O
n:
 T
hu
, 0
5 
Fe
b 
20
09
 1
6:
14
:5
9
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
353Policy making in Northern Ireland
Policy & Politics  vol 36 no 3 • 343–59 (2008) • 10.1332/030557308X307766
• developing a shared vision for local government;
• the number of councils; and
• the functions to transfer to local government.
In terms of the number of councils, the review will consider the three options (7, 11 
or 15 council models) previously set out in the Review of Public Administration: Further 
consultation document (RPA, 2005). In short, a range of structural and functional 
reforms for local government were re-examined – a ‘review of the review’, if you 
will. The new review resulted in a compromise outcome announced by the Minister 
of the Environment in March 2008: there will be 11 new councils from 2011 with 
limited additional functions.
So why is the review unravelling, given the strong empirical basis for its original 
recommendations? The return of devolved government in May 2007 was a significant 
factor. During a debate in the transitional Assembly, serious concerns were expressed 
‘about the potential of a seven council model to centralise services, remove jobs and 
resources from many areas and to underpin sectarianism and community division’ 
(Hay, 2006). Members of the transitional Assembly called on the Secretary of State 
to shelve plans for the so-called seven ‘super councils’ and allow the decision on 
future local government arrangements to be taken by a restored Northern Ireland 
Assembly.
The likely move away from the seven council model under the current Department 
of Environment review will have a major impact on the fundamentals of the original 
reform package in a number of ways. The reforms were predicated on the four 
principles of subsidiarity, equality and good relations, common boundaries, and 
strong local government. Coterminosity will now be much more difficult to achieve 
and almost certainly not on a 1:1 basis between local government and other public 
services such as health, planning and roads. The two-tier regional/sub-regional 
model of public administration that informed the original thinking of the review 
is now in some doubt. The model envisaged the role of the regional tier (Assembly, 
Executive and central government departments) to develop and shape policy and 
legislation, and set strategic objectives for services. The sub-regional tier would 
have, at its core, strong local government based on council areas sharing common 
boundaries with other service providers. The sub-regional tier would be responsible 
for service delivery coordinated by councils through new statutory powers in 
community planning. With likely moves towards a larger number of councils, the 
balance will shift towards more centralised service provision, undermining the 
original two-tier model.
The reporting structures of the new review process confirm its highly centralised 
nature in which senior civil servants dominate. Up until the restoration of devolution 
in May 2007 an RPA Steering Group chaired by the head of the civil service and 
comprising some permanent secretaries, the chair of the Public Service Commission 
and chief executive of the Strategic Investment Board, oversaw the implementation 
of the review. Since devolution a revised structure is now in place. A new RPA 
Strategic Review Group chaired by the head of the civil service and comprising 
only permanent secretaries has been established – a clear indication of the tightening 
central grip on the levers of change. The Strategic Review Group reports directly 
to the Northern Ireland Executive.
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The current chair of the Northern Ireland Society of Local Authority Chief 
Executives (SOLACE) described the position thus:
The RPA proposals for strong local government were suitably vague.… 
Subsequent discussions between senior civil servants and senior local 
government officials have demonstrated that there is, at best, a lack of appetite 
amongst civil servants to transfer responsibilities and resources, and in various 
departments, senior officials have displayed total resistance to the idea of 
functions moving to local government control. (McGrillen, 2007: 52)
These centripetal tendencies could receive further impetus if proposals to remove 
the dual mandate (MLAs who are also local councillors) are implemented by the 
Assembly. Politicians in the new power-sharing Executive may well feel reluctant to 
promote the principle of subsidiarity and devolve functions to local government.
There has also been a political backlash against the proposed reconfiguration 
of local government under the seven council model because of the resulting 
‘balkanisation’ along sectarian lines. Councils in the west of the Province – South, 
West and North West Local Government Districts – will have 55%, 62% and 69% 
Catholic populations, respectively; those in the east of the Province – Inner East, 
East and North East Local Government Districts – will have 73%, 75% and 72% 
Protestant populations, respectively.3 The Belfast Local Government District would 
remain fairly evenly balanced. As equality and good relations were one of the 
guiding principles of the RPA process, such a configuration seems at odds with the 
government’s own policy outlined in A shared future: Policy and strategic framework 
for good relations in Northern Ireland (OFMDFM, 2005). The central message of this 
policy is to promote ‘sharing over separation’ through building ‘strong cohesive 
communities’ (OFMDFM, 2005: 13). Somewhat surprisingly, considerations of 
exacerbating sectarianism did not feature in the thinking of the review team. When 
asked by the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee whether they had taken into 
account such an outcome, the head of the review team responded:
No. Against the background of the analytical work that we have done, ministers 
asked us to give some consideration to the implications of the different scenarios 
– seven, 11 and 15 – in terms of political outcomes, electoral outcomes and 
so on. What I would say on that is that self-evidently the larger the councils, 
the more even the distribution is across, in the sense that minorities are bigger 
within larger councils. (McConnell, 2005: 6)
If doubts have now been raised around the four core principles underpinning the 
RPA (subsidiarity, equality and good relations, common boundaries, and strong local 
government), what are the reforms intended to achieve? In other words, how will 
the outcomes of the RPA be judged? Two recurring themes to which ministers 
made reference were efficiency savings and an improvement in the quality of public 
services. In the case of the former, the (then) Secretary of State in his foreword 
to Better Government for Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Office, 2006: 3) noted: 
‘taxpayers will get better value for their money through the savings made in reducing 
bureaucracy being redirected to front-line services’. He estimated these savings to 
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be in the order of £200 million per annum. His civil servants were, however, more 
circumspect, pointing out that:
[T]here are substantial savings that could be made although it is not an area 
where any one would put our hand up and say ‘this will be the level of savings’. 
That will depend on the ingenuity and innovation of the managers who design 
these new structures. (McConnell, 2005: 7)
Officials being cautious in the face of a complex restructuring of the public 
sector or an exercise in obfuscation? What is clear about these claims of significant 
savings and their reinvestment in frontline services is that they will be difficult (or 
impossible) to track.
The RPA offered the prospect of improved public services. One former minister 
with direct responsibility for the review described it this way: ‘improving the 
quality of public services should be the prime consideration for reform’ (Pearson, 
2004: 1; author’s emphasis). This was also the original intent expressed by the 
Northern Ireland devolved Executive, which stated that ‘ultimately the review of 
public administration must demonstrate it results in measurably better services for 
the public that deliver real value for money’ (OFMDFM, 2004: 89). Yet the ‘prime 
considerations’ of improved quality and measurably better public services seem to 
have disappeared from any of the final statements on the review. The Secretary of 
State’s announcement on the outcome of the review process (Hain, 2005) and the 
Better government for Northern Ireland paper (Northern Ireland Office, 2006) makes 
no reference to improving the quality of public services, much less how this will be 
measured as a consequence of the review’s implementation. This is despite the fact 
that data were gathered4 for the review that baselined people’s satisfaction levels with 
services in advance of implementing the reforms (Knox and Carmichael, 2005).
Conclusion
The RPA benefited from an extensive body of empirical work, which informed 
officials’ advice to ministers. The certainty with which the seven council model 
was promoted as the ‘right’ foundation for all other public sector reforms has led 
to some important questions now being asked, as the key outcomes of the review 
begin to unravel. Was the original empirical evidence wrong? Why is the ‘review of 
the review’, now being undertaken by the Department of the Environment, limiting 
itself to the options previously rejected by the RPA team? Clearly, political factors 
had an important part to play in the turn of events. Two general issues are raised 
in a recent publication by the UK government’s Social Research Unit that help to 
explain the circumstances described in Northern Ireland. First, political commitments 
often lead you in directions that the evidence does not necessarily strongly support. 
Second, a change of government could also mean adjustments to policy priorities 
and policy direction: longer-term policy strategies do not always survive a change 
of administration (Campbell et al, 2007: 13). Devolved government ushered in a 
group of MLAs who, in part, felt goaded by direct rule ministers into power-sharing 
arrangements. One aspect of that provocation by British ministers was to oppose 
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the wishes of all but one of the political parties and the local government sector 
on public sector reform.
When locally elected ministers took over the reins of power they felt little or 
no ownership of direct rule decisions, however well conceived and empirically 
grounded. Faced with a reforms implementation timetable that was already under 
way, ministers opted to decelerate and rethink the fait accompli with which they had 
been presented. This has played into the hands of some civil servants who, from the 
start, openly resisted delegating new powers to councils. MLAs, in turn, will not 
want to see a much strengthened local government sector, particularly if the dual 
mandate is removed. Electoral popularity is not well served by divesting functional 
responsibilities.
There is also a wider political agenda at work. Young at al (2002), for example, 
describe one model of research–policy relations in which policy is the outcome 
of a political process. The evidence base is politically driven, with studies used to 
support the position of the government of the day, the relevant minister or perhaps 
civil servants most closely involved. This model is at odds with the ‘assumed relatively 
unproblematic rational and linear, relationships between research, evidence, policy 
and practice’ referred to by Nutley and colleagues (Nutley, 2007: 6; Nutley et al, 
2007). This rational approach does not reflect the realities of policy making in practice. 
Walker (2007: 235), for example, argues that empiricists ‘have a problem with the 
sheer messiness of politics and, by extension, with the interface between political 
will and bureaucratic outcome’. He cites Dunn (2000) who claims that would-be 
suppliers of evidence for policy ‘mistake the rhetoric of coherence and steadiness 
of purpose for the reality of improvisation, trade-offs, confusion, discomfiture and 
sheer fatigue’ – the political context of decision making. Walker concludes that there 
‘can be politics without evidence but probably not the converse’ and ‘if evidence 
comes first’ then it may be bad for democracy. Bulmer et al (2007) also highlight the 
importance of politics in decision making. They describe various obstacles to the 
implementation of evidence-based policy, one of which is the political direction and 
ultimately political control synonymous with the system of government in the UK. 
They contest the extent to which policy making is evidence driven or even evidence 
based, describing the situation as better characterised by ‘evidence-informed’ rather 
than ‘evidence-based’ policy making.
The political context in which the RPA was/is being conducted is hugely 
important in understanding the relationship between its empirical findings and their 
(lack of) influence on policy making. The overriding political concern in Northern 
Ireland is to support and embed the hard-fought power-sharing Executive. The 
Democratic Unionist Party/Sinn Féin ‘partnership’ has shown early signs of success. 
This success is, in part, predicated on having ministers with significant departmental 
functions who can promote themselves as mature politicians capable of moving out 
of the sectarian bear pit and, importantly, in the case of the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) and Ulster Unionist Party, advancing their political parties 
in the future. None of this is possible if government departments over which these 
ministers preside lose functions. If, for example, the existing Department of Regional 
Development (DRD), which has already seen the transfer of the water service to a 
government-owned company outside the remit of the civil service, hands over its 
roads functions to local government, the DRD minister will in effect be without 
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portfolio. In short, the retention of public services at the centre operating through 
civil service departments is critical to shoring-up and stabilising the power-sharing 
Executive.
In analysing whether and how research gets used, Nutley et al (2007) cite four 
key factors: the nature of the research to be applied; the personal characteristics 
of both researchers and potential research users; the links between research and its 
users; and the context for the use of the research. Above all, they conclude it is the 
last of these – context – that seems to be the key to whether and how research 
gets used. The rational, linear model referred to above, which ‘views evidence from 
research as relatively straightforward facts to be weighed in making policy decisions 
… fails to fully capture the complexity of the research/policy nexus, the political 
context or the contested nature of research evidence’ (Nutley et al, 2007: 268). So 
it is in Northern Ireland. The new political dispensation in the form of devolution 
(December 1999) hastened a review of the structures of public administration; the 
Secretary of State baited local politicians with the threat of an imposed ‘solution’ 
in the form of the policy document Better government for Northern Ireland (Northern 
Ireland Office, 2006) to further wider political goals; and, most recently, the internal 
struggle between Stormont and local government, all testify to the highly political 
context in which the RPA is taking place.
The ‘review of the review’ has led to a reconsideration of the structures of 
public bodies: a postponement in setting up the education and skills authority; a 
re onsideration of how many councils to have; and whether to proceed with the 
health and social services authority. ‘Back to the drawing board’ has been to the 
detriment of a parallel reform track aimed at modernising public services, now being 
considered only on what civil servants describe as ‘a care and maintenance basis’. 
The OFMDFM’s Policy Innovation Unit promotes the development of an evidence 
base in order to achieve effective policy making, arguing that ‘good quality policy 
making depends on high quality information’ (OFMDFM, 2007: 7). The RPA as 
a case study in evidence-based policy making has demonstrated that an extensive 
empirical base cannot, in itself, guarantee particular policy outcomes. It also rather 
ironically illustrates that the comprehensive information gathered to help formulate 
policies on reform has not been replicated on policy outcomes. The RPA appears 
not only to be unravelling but its central purposes, defined in measurable policy 
outputs and outcomes, are far from clear and have shifted over time. If it is not about 
achieving efficiency savings and an improvement in the quality of public services 
(its original goals), what is the RPA trying to achieve?
Notes
1 The Northern Ireland Assembly governs Northern Ireland in respect of ‘transferred 
matters’, and also ‘reserved matters’ with the Secretary of State’s consent. ‘Excepted 
matters’ remain the responsibility of the UK Parliament. Examples of transferred matters 
are education, health and agriculture. Reserved matters include policing and criminal 
law, which will be transferred to the Assembly at a later date. Excepted matters are those 
of national importance, such as defence, taxation and foreign policy.
2 The detail of the research evidence referred to in this section can be accessed at www.
archive.rpani.gov.uk/researchguide.htm
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3 These figures are based on aggregating the 2001 population Census data for the 
amalgam of existing local authorities proposed under the seven council model. They 
do not take account of some changes outlined by the Local Government Boundaries 
Commissioner.
4 Two probability survey datasets, the Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey 2002 (n=1,203) 
and the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2003 (n=1,800) asked respondents 
how satisfied they were with public services.
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